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I

n a book published in 1954 the author said: "By 1907 the proportion of the
laws of war embodied in general convention(s) far exceeded, and still exceeds
to this day, that of the law ofpeace."l What he failed to mention was that, apart
from the 1925 Geneva Protocol concerning gas and bacteriological warfare,2
the conventional law of war relating to the conduct of hostilities dated (and still
dates) from 1907;3 and that there was not (and is not) a single piece of
international legislation dealing specifically with what might well be considered
a fairly important aspect of modem warfare-war in and from the air!4
Shortly after the end of World War I an anonymous article 'appeared in the
prestigious British Yearbook of International Law the thesis of which was that, the
League of Nations having been established, it would be a "disastrous mistake"
for the governments of member nations to use this new machinery to codify (or
expand?) the law of war; and that the past failure of international law to provide
viable solutions to the problems of peace was, at least in part, due to the
preoccupation of writers and statesmen with the law ofwar and their consequent
neglect of the law ofpeace. 5 Two arguments were advanced: first, that inasmuch
as war had been abolished, there was no longer anything for the law of war to
regulate;6 and second, that in any event there was no point in wasting time and
7
energy on rules of war because such rules would only be broken. These
arguments did not go unchallenged;8 but that they prevailed with the majority
of statesmen and international lawyers of the day is evident from the fact that
the Third Hague Peace Conference, which had not been convened because of
the advent of World War I, was never called into session and, despite the
tremendous technological advances demonstrated during that war, the
9
Regulations attached to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 continued to
be the latest expression of States with respect to the conduct of hostilities. lO
Thus it was these Regulations, drafted in 1907, prior to the advent of such
weapons as the tank and the airplane, weapons which had completely
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revolutionized warfare, which constituted the basic rules governing hostilities
during World War II.
It could easily be assumed that the events ofWorld War II would have caused
a less antagonistic attitude towards efforts to modernize the law of war.11
However, such was not the case. In a statement which could have been written
by our anonymous post-World War I author and his adherents, the International
Law Commission made the following decision at its 1949 organizational
meeting:
"18. The Commission considered whether the laws of war should be selected as
a topic for codification. It was suggested that, war having been outlawed, the regulation
of its conduct had ceased to be relevant. On the other hand, the opinion was expressed
that, although the term 'laws of war' ought to be discarded, a study of the rules
governing the use of anned force-legitimate or illegitimate-might be useful..
. . The majority of the Commission declared itself opposed to the study of the
problem at the present stage. It was considered that if the Commission, at the very
beginning ofits work, were to undertake this study, public opinion might interpret its action
as showing lack of corifidence in the efficiency of the means at the disposal of the United
Nations for maintaining peace. ,,12 (Emphasis added.)

As a result of that decision, and despite strong arguments in support of the need
to modernize the law of war advanced by many of the leading international
lawyers,13 the Commission has, more than twenty years later, never of its own
volition considered any aspect of the law of war. At the present time, then, we
are compelled to apply to wars being fought in the eighth decade of the 20th
century rules governing the conduct of hostilities which were drafted in the first
decade of that century. 14 Just imagine the chaos if we were using the traffic
regulations of that earlier horse-and-buggy decade to regulate to day's traffic!
Imagine Broadway and Forty-second Street with no traffic lights, no traffic
policemen, no stop signs, and a five-mile per hour speed limit! But such are the
rules under which the world community of nations, by its ostrich-like attitude,
1S
has permitted and continues to permit wars to be fought.
Like the anonymous writer after World War I and like the International Law
Commission after World War II, the United Nations itself has long been
extremely reluctant to exert any effort toward modernizing the law of war for
fear that public opinion might interpret such action as lack of confidence in that
16
organization's ability to maintain the peace. But more recently there is
evidence that the General Assembly is becoming increasingly realistic in its
approach to this problem and that humanitarian considerations are, at long last,
having an effect. The International Conference on Human Rights, meeting in
Teheran in May 1968, adopted a resolution which requested the General
Assembly to invite the Secretary-General to study
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"the need for additional humanitarian international conventions or for possible
revision of existing Conventions to ensure the better protection of civilians,
prisoners and combatants in all armed conflicts and the-rrohibition and limitation
of the use of certain methods and means of warfare."l
This Resolution, in tum, resulted in the adoption by the General Assembly of
Resolution 2444 (XXIII); 18 the preparation of the study Respectfor Human Rights
in Armed Conflict by the Secretary-General;19 and the adoption by the General
Assembly on December 16, 1969, of Resolution 2597 (XXIV), the pertinent
operative portions of which read as follows:
1. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the study initiated by resolution
2444 (XXIII), giving special attention to the need for protection of the rights
ofcivilians and combatants in conflicts which arise from the struggles ofpeoples

under colonial and foreign rule for liberation and self-determination and to
the better application of existing humanitarian international conventions and
rules to such conflicts;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to consult and cooperate closely with the
International Committee of the Red Cross in regard to the studies being
undertaken by that body on this question;

*********
5. Decides to give the highest priority to this question at the twenty-fifth session
of the General Assembly;
6. II/vites the Secretary-General to present a further report on this subject to the
General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session?O

As it will have been noted from the foregoing, there is another powerful force
at work in this area-the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRq?l
Even during the arid period in the codification of the so-called "Hague" law of
war22 after World War I, the ICRC was successful in obtaining the convening
ofa diplomatic conference in Geneva in 1929 which not only redrafted the 1906
Geneva Convention,23 but also drafted the first convention dealing exclusively
with the subject of prisoners of war?4 And in 1949, just shortly after the
International Law Commission had reached its decision not to include the law
of war on its agenda, another diplomatic conference was convened at Geneva
at the instance of the ICRC and, based on many years of preparatory work by
the ICRC, it drafted and adopted four humanitarian conventions,25 including
26
the first ever to deal exclusively with the protection of civilians. Moreover,
when Resolution 2444 (XXIII) was adopted by the General Assembly, its basis
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was a resolution which had been adopted at the XXth International Conference
ofthe Red Cross at Vienna in 1965;27 and at the XXIst International Conference
of the Red Cross, held in Istanbul in September 1969, a number of relevant
28
resolutions were adopted. Assuredly, with the General Assembly and the
ICRC acting together in a concerted effort to reach the identical goal, the
prospect for the revision and modernization of the law of war may now be
viewed with some minimum degree of optimiS:{11. Of course, there is a long
international road to travel from proposals, to draft convention, to diplomatic
conference, to signed convention, to ratification by a sufficiently large number
of States, including the great powers, to make any such revision and
modernization meaningful?9 but the very willingness of the General Assembly
to acknowledge that the problem exists is "a giant step forward for all mankind."
It is perhaps appropriate to mention at this point a suggestion which has been
offered in order to make work in this area more palatable to those who have
heretofore opposed it. This suggestion is that the tenn "anned conflict" be used
as a substitute for the word "war" in the context of rules governing hostilities.
It will be recalled that in the 1949 decision of the International Law Commission
not to enter this field, those who opposed that decision suggested that the tenn
30
"laws of war" be discarded. The same suggestion is to be found in the ICRC's
proposals and practice and is stated to be based ripon the need "to take account
of the deep aspiration of the peoples to see peace installed.,,31 And the Report,
AI7720, makes the same suggestion, but apparently for the perhaps more logical
reason that "anned conflict" is a considerably more all-inclusive tenn, and
c:
Iess sub'~ect to di spute, th
..
th erelore
an'IS" war. ,,32 Wh atever th e motivation,
suc h
a change appears to be essentially one of semantics, and there does not appear
to be any substantive objection to it. Moreover, if it will reduce opposition to
the project for the revision and modernization of the applicable law, it will have
33
served a useful and beneficial purpose. Accordingly, the balance of this paper
will use the tenns "anned conflict," "rules ofanned conflict," and "law ofanned
conflict," and, except where speaking historically, will pointedly refrain from
the use of such antiquated tenns as "war," "rules of war," and "law of war"!
Assuming then that the time is approaching when affinnative steps will be
taken to revise and modernize the law ofanned conflict, the question is presented
as to the specific areas in which such revision and modernization is needed. Any
attempt to answer that question completely would probably necessitate a listing
which would cover many pages and explanatory matter which would fill many
tomes. This paper, as its title indicates, will be limited to several matters
considered to be the major inadequacies relating to the protection ofindividuals
during anned conflict which presently exist and require correction. They are:
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1. The non-existence of and the need for a method for the automatic
detennination that a particular inter-State relationship requires the application
of the law of anned conflict;34

2. The non-existence of and the need for a method which will ensure the
presence in the territory of each party to an anned conflict of a Protecting
Power or an international body with adequate authority to police compliance
with the law of anned conflict;
3. The non-existence ofand the need for a complete and total prohibition of the
use in anned conflict ofany and all categories ofchemical and biological agents;
and

4. The non-existence of and the need for a complete code governing the use of
air power in anned conflict with emphasis on the outright prohibition of any
type ofbombing which has as its basic target the civilian population.

In the discussion of each of these inadequacies in the present law governing
armed conflict, an effort will be made to show the nature of the particular
inadequacy and why it exists and to suggest possible remedies, with the caveat
that the suggested remedies are not intended to exclude other, possibly more
practical and practicable, solutions. In view of the very nature ofthe inadequacies
discussed, there would appear to be litde need to advance arguments as to why
each is deemed of sufficient import to be considered a major inadequacy
requiring a remedy.

1. The non-existence if and the need for a method for the automatic determination
that a particular inter-State relationship requires the application ifthe law ifarmed conflict.
One of the major inadequacies of the present law of armed conflict is that
there is in existence no method for the automatic issuance of an authoritative
and effective determination that the relationship between two or more States
has reached a point where that law should be applied.
Under Article 1 of the Third Hague Convention of 1907 hostilities were
instituted by a "reasoned declaration ofwar or ... an ultimatum with conditional
declaration of war"; and under Article 2 of that Convention the belligerents had
35
the duty to notify neutrals of the existence of a state of war. Of course, were
these provisions uniformly complied with by States, the problem under
discussion would not exist. Unfortunately, more often than not they have been
honored in the breach. In 1914, just seven years after they had become a part
ofinternational legislation, Germany attacked Belgium without a declaration of
36
war and started a policy which has been followed all too frequendy since then.

134

Levie on the Law of War

Moreover, a number of nations have denied the applicability of the law of war
by the use of subterfuge or perversion of the facts. Thus, the Sino-Japanese
conflict of the late 1930s was designated by Japan as a "police action" which, it
was claimed, did not bring the law of war into effect; and in numerous other
cases the applicability of the provisions of the 1907 Hague and of the 1929
Geneva Conventions was rejected on the mere basis of a denial of the existence
of a state of war-despite clear and undeniable evidence to the contrary.
Concerning this situation the ICRC later said:
". . . Since 1907 experience has shown that many anned conflicts, displaying all
the characteristics of a war, may arise without being preceded by any of the
formalities laid down in the Hague Convention. Furthermore, there have been
many cases where Parties to a conflict have contested the legitimacy of the enemy
Government and therefore refused to recognize the existence of a state of war. In
the same way, the temporary disappearance of sovereign States as a result of
annexation or capitulation has been put forward as a pretext for not observing one
or other of the humanitarian Conventions. It was necessary to find a remedy to
this state of affairs ... ,,37

As the problem had thus long been recognized, in preparing the so-called
Stockholm draft conventions (the working papers for the 1949 Diplomatic
Conference which drafted the four 1949 Geneva Conventions) the ICRC
attempted to solve it by proposing the employment of a phrase making each
Convention applicable "to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if
the state of war is not recognized by one of them." This proposal was adopted
by the Diplomatic Conference without change and without debate. 38
A great feeling of accomplishment was engendered by the acceptance of this
supposedly all-inclusive phrase by the Diplomatic Conference. The same ICRC
study quoted above said of it:
"By its general character, this paragraph deprives belligerents, in advance, of the
pretexts they might in theory put forward for evading their obligations. There is
no need for a formal declaration of war, or for the recognition of a state of war,
as preliminaries to the application of the Convention . . . The occurrence of de
facto hostilities is sufficient . . . Any difference arising between two States and
leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces is an armed conflict
within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of
a state of war.... ,,39
Unfortunately, it has not uniformly worked out this way in practice. Thus,
for example, in Vietnam, where thousands of planes have been shot down, tens
of thousands of human beings have been killed, and millions of rounds of
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ammunition have been expended, the position has been taken by North Vietnam
that the humanitarian conventions governing anned conflict, to which she long·
40
ago acceded, do not apply.
Thus, after W orId War II it was considered necessary to evolve a method
which would make it impossible for States to engage in armed conflict and
attempt to justify non-compliance with the then law of war by denying the
existence of a state of war through some subterfuge such as labelling it a "police
action," alleging the lack of a declaration of war, etc. Now, once again, it is
necessary to seek a method which will make it impossible for States to engage
in armed conflict and attempt to justify non-compliance with the present (or
future) law of armed conflict by advancing the same or new subterfuges, such
as labelling the armed conflict as "legitimate self-defense," or as "assistance to
an ally in an internal conflict," or as "assistance to peoples engaged in a national
liberation movement aimed at throwing off the yoke of imperialism," etc. 41
And contriving new phrases of limitation will probably be no more successful
in solving the problem than they have in the past as they would merely serve as
a basis for future evasions of a different type.
It is suggested that a true and effective solution could be attained by assigning
the power to make a determination as to the existence ofa state ofanned ·conflict
to a pre-selected international body; by making the decision reached by that
body as to the existence ofa state of anned conflict binding on the States direcdy
involved, as well as on all other Parties to the Convention; and by providing for
the automatic imposition of total sanctions whenever this body determines that
its decision is not being respected by a State party to the armed conflict in that
such State has, despite such decision, continued to deny the applicability of the
law of armed conflict, or any part of it, or is, in fact, violating such law. 42
At the 1949 Diplomatic Conference two proposals were made which can be
related to this problem. The Greek representative suggested that the existence
ofa state of belligerency should be decided by the Security Council ofthe United
Nations. He later amplified this proposal by explaining that he had meant that
such recognition of belligerency should be given by a majority of the countries
represented on the Security Council. 43 A French proposal, which was actually
concerned with the problem of a substitute for the Protecting Power, would
have established on a permanent basis, immediately upon the Conventions
becoming effective, a "High International Committee for the Protection of
Humanity," consisting of thirty members elected by the Parties to the
Convention from nominations made by the Parties, by the Hague "International
[permanent] Court of Arbitration," and by the "International Red Cross
Standing Committee." Nominations were to be made from
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"amongst persons of high standing, without distinction of nationality, known for
their moral authority, their spiritual and intellectual independence and the services
they have rendered to humanity-"
"In particular, they may be selected from amongst persons distinguished in the
political, religious, scientific and legal domains, and amongst winners of the Nobel
Peace Prize--,,44

While this proposal was not incorporated into the Conventions, it was the
subject of a resolution adopted by the Diplomatic Conference which
recommended that consideration be given as soon as possible to the advisability
of setting up an international body to ~erform the functions of a Protecting
4
Power in the absence of such a Power.
These two proposals are mentioned here because they suggest alternative
methods of attempting to solve our problem: one by the use of an established
political body; the other by the use of a new body created specifically for the
purpose and which is made as neutral and apolitical as it is possible to do in these
days ofhypernationalism.
The suggested use of the Security Council (or, indeed, of any political body)
is not considered to be a feasible solution. That body is composed of the
representatives of States, voting on the basis of decisions reached in Foreign
Offices, decisions which are made on the basis of self-interest and political
expediency, and which are not necessarily consonant with the facts. It is
inconceivable, for example, that the Security Council would ever reach a
decision, over the opposition of North Vietnam (and, more important, of the
Soviet Union), that the situation in Vietnam demands the application of the
46
humanitarian conventions which govern the law of armed conflict.
On the other hand, a specially constituted body of perhaps twenty-five
individuals, each of whom is of sufficient personal international stature to be
above politics and would act as an individual and as his or her moral and ethical
principles dictated, detached and unaffected by instructions, could well
constitute an acceptable and effective international body. The provisions for the
selection of the members of this body (the "International Commission for the
Enforcement of Humanitarian Rights during Armed Conflict"-ICEHRAC)
would be sufficiendy restrictive to ensure the choice of the type of individual
described, without regard to nationality, race, religion, color, or geographical
distribution. The ICEHRAC would be selected as soon as the constitutive
convention had become effective and would be a permanent body, perhaps
self-perpetuating. 47 Any Party to the convention, whether or not itselfinvolved,
could, at any time, request a determination by ICEHRAC as to whether the
relationship between two or more States was such as to call into effect the
application of the law of armed conflict; the States involved would be invited
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to present any facts or arguments they desired but would not otherwise
participate in the decision-making process;48 an affirmative decision would
immediately be binding not only upon the States involved, but on all of the
other Parties to the Convention; and a subsequent finding by ICEHRAC that
its decision was not being complied with would automatically, and without
further action of any kind, require the application of complete economic and
communications sanctions against the violating State by all of the other Parties
. 49
to th e C onventlon.
To many this proposal will undoubtedly appear Utopian, idealistic, and
impractical. However, upon reflection this reaction may appear somewhat less
valid. There are today more than one hundred States which are not presently
involved in the type of armed conflict under discussion. Each and every one of
them considers that should it become involved in such activities in the future,
it would be on the side of the angels--so the provisions of any such convention
would naturally apply in its favor and against the opponent. Moreover, to what
will it have agreed? Merely that a neutral, internationally-created body, which
it helped create, may determine that a situation in which that State unexpectedly
finds itself calls for the application of the humanitarian law of armed conflict.
What would that mean to it? Only that it could not kill, or otherwise maltreat,
protected persons such as the sick and wounded, prisoners of war, and civilian
noncombatants, and that it could not have recourse to certain prohibited
methods of conducting hostilities. Can any State advance the argument that it
refuses to ratify such a convention because it does not wish its sovereign power
of action limited in these respects, it wishes to retain the unfettered ability to
kill and maltreat these people at will and that it wishes, for example, to retain
the possibility of using weapons which have been banned?50 Moreover, once
such a convention is drafted and presented for signature and ratification, the
moral and humanitarian pressure to bring about ratifications would be
tremendous and there would be an excellent possibility of its general
51
acceptance. While certain States which have adopted obsolete attitudes
magnifying national sovereignty might well oppose such a proposal from
beginning to end, it is predictable that they would participate, albeit reluctantly,
in the diplomatic conference which was convened to draft such a convention
and would eventually, rather than risk international opprobrium, become Parties
. 52
to It.
This, then, is the suggested remedy to the problem of establishing a method
for the automatic determination that an existing situation necessitates the
application of the law of armed conflict. While it would, it is true, entail a
somewhat broader delegation of authority than States have heretofore been
willing to make, it is believed that the time is past when States may argue
"national sovereignty" as an excuse for refusing to participate in the creation of

138

Levie on the Law of War

an international institution the sole function of which will be to limit the illegal
and nonhumanitarian conduct of hostilities in anned conflict.
2. The non-existence of and the need for a method which will ensure the presence in
the territory ofeach State party to an armed coriflict ofa Protecting Power or an international
body with adequate authority to police compliance with that law.
Another major inadequacy in the old law of war and in the present law of
armed conflict is that there has never been an "umpire" with sufficient authority
to oversee the application of the law, to investigate alleged or possible violations,
to determine the facts with respect thereto, and to take the necessary action to
ensure the correction of the default.
For many centuries there has existed in customary international law an
institution known as the Protecting Power. By the time ofthe Spanish-American
War (1898), the traditional functions of that Protecting Power had come to
include some aspects of the protection ofprisoners ofwar. 53 During World War
I a number of formal agreements were entered into confirming the existence of
the Protecting Power and its activities with respect to prisoners of war, which
had until then rested entirely on custom, and specifying a number offunctions. 54
55
Subsequendy, in Article 86 of the 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention
this institution received formal recognition in a general multilateral treaty
concerned with ensuring humanitarian treatment for one class ofvictims of war.
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions reaffirm the Protecting Power as an
international humanitarian institution.56 There is now, therefore, binding
international legislation establishing the Protecting Power as an international
institution during time of anned conflict and specifying a number of its duties
and powers with respect to the protection of wounded and sick, prisoners of
war, and civilian noncombatants. Unfortunately, the provision concerning the
original designation of Protecting Powers by belligerents is less than clear,
apparendy relying on customary international law in this respect, although a
great deal of time, effort, and controversy were expended at the 1949 Diplomatic
Conference with respect to the designation of replacements and substitutes for
an original Protecting Power. 57 In any event, although there have probably been
close to one hundred armed conflicts of various sorts and sizes since the end of
World War II, the institution of the Protecting Power has not once during that
58
period been called into being. While the Report advances a number ofpossible
reasons for this failure,59 it is believed that many of them are completely
irrelevant and that, for the most part, the failure to secure the designation of
such a Power has resulted from the fact that the States involved did not wish to
have on their territory a neutral presence concerned with the problem of the
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extent to which there was compliance with the provisions of the specifically
· · convennons
.
. thl
h umarutanan
goverrung
e aw 0 f arme d co nfli60
ct.
The failure of the Protecting Power as an institution and the need for some
effective system of supervision appears to be very generally admitted. Thus in
answer to the Secretary General's inquiry concerning the preparation of his
Report, India stated that it believed that the solution to the problem "would
perhaps be found more through the complete implementation of the existing
conventions than through the search for new legal instruments.,,61 And the
response of the United States acknowledged "a strongly held conviction that
steps are urgendy needed to secure better apElication of existing humanitarian
international conventions to armed conflicts."o2 Similarly, the Report states that
"there would be pressing need for measures to improve and strengthen the present
system of international supervision and assistance to parties to armed conflicts in
their observance of humanitarian norms of international law.... ,,63

And another organization concerned with preserving humanitarian rights
said, with respect to the Protecting Power:
"Certainly it is time that this valuable international custom was revived in the
modem context ofarmed conflicts. An initiative ofthis kind by the United Nations
would set a precedent as a means oflessening the brutality of conflicts, and would
accord with the aim expressed in the Charter.... ,,64

And, finally, Resolution XI of the XXlst International Conference of the Red
Cross "calls upon all parties to allow the Protecting Power or the International
Committee of the Red Cross free access to prisoners of war and to all places of
their detention.,,65 Further, it should be borne in mind that nowhere in either
customary or conventional international law is there any rule which would
authorize the Protecting Power, even if it were designated and functioning, to
supervise the compliance of a belligerent with that area of the law of armed
. th e cond uct 0 fh os tili··
confli ct goverrung
nes. 66
Although, as has been stated, no Protecting Power has been designated in
any armed conflict which has occurred since World War II, on a number of
occasions the ICRC has been permitted to perform its humanitarian functions. 67
Perhaps because ofthis, the Report calls it the most effective private organization
concerned with respect for human rights in armed conflict, ascribes this to "its
history, past experience, and its established and well deserved reputation of
68
impartiality," and recommends its strengthening. But not even the ICRC has
been uniformly successful in having its services accepted. Thus, while it was
permitted to perform humanitarian functions in the prisoner-of-war camps
maintained in South Korea during the period of hostilities in that country
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(1950-53), it was never pennitted in North Korea where, as a result, there was
no "guardian" of the Conventions; 69 similarly, while it has functioned in South
Vietnam over a considerable period of time, it has never been pennittedin North
Vietnam?O and its trials and tribulations in Biafra and Nigeria are too recent to
' 71
. el
reqmre
ab
oratlon.
There is, then, a double need in this area: (1) a need to devise a method which

will ensure the existence of a "third" presence, either a Protecting Power or
some substitute therefor, on the territory of each State party to an armed conflict;
and (2) a need to grant to that Protecting Power, or the substitute therefor,
adequate authority to ensure compliance with all of the law of armed conflict,
including that relating to the conduct ofhostilities. 72 The provisions of the 1949
Geneva Conventions for the designation of Protecting Powers have not been
at all effective73 and those relating to substitutes for Protecting Powers have
been only partially successful. It is apparent, then, that the only real solution
would be, once again, to have a provision in a convention which would, in
appropriate cases, automatically trigger action by ICEHRAC?4 Thus the
convention creating that institution could provide that, when the existence of
a state of armed conflict is acknowledged by the States involved, or when a
decision to that effect has been reached by ICEHRAC in accordance with the
other provisions of the convention, and no Protecting Powers have been
designated in accordance with customary intemationallaw75 within one week
thereafter, ICEHRAC would automatically begin to function in the capacity of
a substitute for the Protecting Power, with all the rights and duties which have
been, or which may be, granted to such Powers?6 And such rights and duties
should include the supervision of the application of all of the law of armed
conflict and should not be restricted to the protections afforded under the 1949
Geneva Conventions. After all, a human being, combatant or noncombatant,
suffers just as much, or is just as dead, be his improp er treatment due to a violation
of those conventions or to the use of dum-dum bullets (in violation of the 1899
Hague Declaration), or the use of poison (in violation of the 1907 Hagt!e
Regulations), or the use of gas (in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol), etc.77
In many respects the foregoing proposal parallels suggestions contained in the
Report?8 Nor is it believed that the U.S.S.R. and the other Communist
countries would necessarily oppose such a solution merely because they made
reservations to Article 10/10/10/11,19 and because the Soviet Union made a
statement indicating that it did not consider Resolution 2 ofthe 1949 Diplomatic
80
Conference necessary. Events subsequent to 1949 have demonstrated the need
for an institution capable of perfonning the functions of the Protecting Power
and competent to take such functions upon itself immediately when the need
therefor becomes apparent. 81 It is believed that only in this fashion will the world
community of nations provide a satisfactory and effective method of ensuring
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in every case of anned conflict the presence of an impartial agency with the
function of making certain that the law of anned conflict is fully and properly
82
appIied.

3. The non-existence cif and the need Jor a complete and total prohibition
in armed conflict cif any and all categories cif chemical and biological agents.

cif the use

A third major inadequacy in the existing law relating to the protection of
individuals during anned conflict is the lack of a comprehensive and generally
accepted ban on the use as weapons of all types and categories of both chemical
and biological agents.
While there is probably no real equal to the disaster that would descend upon
this earth should an all-out nuclear war occur, potentially the use of other
uncontrollable methods of mass destruction could be almost equally disastrous
for mankind. 83 Dozens of chemical agents, and numerous biological agents,84
all with varying degrees oflethality, that have been determined to be the most
"useful" are now included in the arsenals of a number of nations for possible use
85
in the event of anned conflict. Hundreds of books and articles have been
86
87
written and millions of words have been spoken on the subject. For the
most part they have been concerned with the questions ofwhether there is today
any customary rule of international law which prohibits the use of chemical
agents in anned conflict and whether biological agents fall within the
well-established prohibitions against the use of "poisons" and against the use of
weapons which cause "unnecessary suffering"; but also, in more recent days,
\vith the inhumanity of these weapons and the highlighting of the moral and
ethical basis for the universal acceptance by nations of a strict and all-inclusive
ban on the use in anned conflict of any and all types of both chemical and
. al agents.88
· IOglC
b10
A very brief history of the attempts to ban the use of chemical (and
bacteriological) agents as weapons will probably serve to clarify the current
problem as well as the suggestion for solving it. Chemical warfare of differing
varieties has existed for centuries. 89 Although the 1868 Declaration of St.
Petersburg90 actually dealt with explosive bullets, it is often cited as the beginning
of the attempt to ban the use of chemical agents in anned conflict because of a
preambular clause which deplored "the employment of anns which uselessly
aggravate the suffering of disabled men, or render their death inevitable."
Chemical agents, it is contended, fall within this classification.
The 1899 Hague Peace Conference adopted a number of provisions which
are said to have indirecdy, or which did direcdy, ban the use of chemical agents.
91
Thus the Regulations attached to the Second Hague Convention drafted by
that Conference stated that the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring
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the enemy was not unlimited (Art. 22) and they especially prohibited the
employment of poison or poisoned weapons (Art. 23a) and of arms, projectiles,
or material of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering (Art. 23e). In addition, a
Declaration concerning the Prohibition of Using Projectiles the Sole Object of
92
which is the Diffusion ofAsphyxiating or Deleterious Gases was drafted. While
this Declaration was not repeated at the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, the
provisions of the Regulations attached to the Fourth Hague Convention of
93
1907 were identical with those cited from its 1899 predecessor.
World War I saw the use of gas introduced by Germany, followed thereafter
by its use by the Allies. The Treaty ofVersailles contained an article which stated
that the "use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids,
materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are
stricdy forbidden in Germany.,,94 Nevertheless, it would be an exaggeration to
say that when the Treaty of Versailles was signed in 1919 there was in existence
any generally accepted rule of international law prohibiting the use of chemical
agents in armed conflict. In 1922 the five great maritime nations of that time
(France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) drafted and
signed the Treaty of Washington relating to the use of submarines and noxious
gases which contained a provision that, the use of "asphyxiating, poisonous or
other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been jusdy
condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of
such use having been declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilized
Powers are parties," the signatories "declare their assent to such prohibition. ,,95
While this treaty never became effective (France failed to ratifY it because of the
provisions relating to submarines), it constituted an important landmark in the
law of armed conflict. And three years later, at the Conference which met in
Geneva to establish controls on international trade in munitions,96 a Protocol
was drafted which contained wording lifted bodily from the Treaty of
Washington and, in addition, contained an agreement "to extend this
prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods ofwarfare.,,97 As of October
30, 1969, there were 68 States parties to this 1925 Geneva Protocol. 98 The great
majority, however, have ratified it with reservations which make it applicable
only as regards other States which are also Parties to it; and which make it
inapplicable in the event it is violated by the enemy.99
100
Gas was subsequendy used by Italy against Ethiopia in the 1935-36 war.
Italy admitted this use in the League of Nations and unsuccessfully attempted to
justifY it as a reprisal for other alleged violations ofinternational law by Ethiopia.
Japan used gas against China in their hostilities of the late 1930s; and the Soviet
Union contended that Japan used bacteriological agents against China in the
1930s. This was never established by acceptable evidence and, so far as appears,
there was no use in armed conflict of either chemical or bacteriological weapons
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101
by any belligerent during World War II.
During the Korean hostilities the
Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Korea all contended that the
United States forces in the United Nations Command had used bacteriological
102
weapons.
The United States denied this and demanded an investigation
which was refused. It is interesting to note that in an official book published in
Moscow in 1967 no mention is made of these allegations, although the charge
against the Japanese is reiterated and the use of defoliants in Vietnam is strongly
1
criticized. 3 The charge was also made, and apparendy verified by the ICRC,
that Egypt used a chemical agent against the Royalists in the Yemen. 104 Egypt
denied the charge and invited an investigation. As in the case of the similar
demand made by the United States in Korea, no such investigation ever took
place.
The ICRC Draft Rules contain a blunt and broad prohibition against the use
of "incendiary, chemical, bacteriological, radioactive or other agents,,;10S on a
number of occasions the General Assembly has adopted resolutions calling for
strict observance of the "principles and ob~ectives" of the 1925 Geneva Protocol
and inviting non-Parties to accede to it; 06 and on at least one occasion it has
declared the use of chemical and biological agents of warfare "as contrary to the
generally recognized rules ofinternational law, as embodied in the ProtocoL,,107
Some writers also urge that the use of these weapons is prohibited by customary
international law. 108 It appears however that, particularly in the light of recent
developments, this is a sterile approach to the problem.
When the 1925 Geneva Protocol was sent to the United States Senate for its
advice and consent to ratification, this was refused; and accordingly, the United
States is not presendy a Party to the ProtocoL 109 As a result, the United States
has long taken the position that, while it will not be the first user of the weapons
prohibited by that international agreement, it "is not a party to any treaty, now
in force, that prohibits or restricts the use in warfare of toxic or nontoxic gases,
of smoke or incendiary materials, or of bacteriological warfare.,,110 Although
the United States has not used any toxic chemical, or any bacteriological agent,
since the Protocol became effective as between the Parties to it, the fact that it
refused to ratifY the Protocol has not only caused it to have problems in the
diplomatic field,lll but has also undoubtedly deterred a number of other States
from becoming Parties to it.
On November 25,1969, President Nixon made an announcement of major
.
. this sub·~ect. 112 This announcement mc
. Iu d ed :
Importance
concerrung
1. A reaffinnation of the renunciation by the United States of the first use of
lethal chemical weapons;
2. An extension of this renunciation to the first use of incapacitating chemicals;
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3. An intention to resubmit the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate forits advice
and consent to ratification;
4. Renunciation by the United States of the use oflethal biological agents and
weapons;
5. Confining biological research to defense measures;
6. Disposing of all stocks of bacteriological weapons; and
7. Associating the United States with the principles and objectives of the United
Kingdom Draft Convention on biological weapons. 113

It is assumed that this action by the United States, its prospective ratification of
the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and its expressed willingness to become a party to a
convention banning biologicals will lead the way to the goal which the United
Nations General Assembly has long sought to reach-universal acceptance of
prohibitions on chemical and biological agents and weapons. 114 Unfortunately,
it appears that there is still one major problem which requires solution-the
status of the use of certain types of chemical agents. For while diplomats,
scientists, and international lawyers are, for the most part, in general agreement
that lethal gases and all biologicals either are, or should be, prohibited by the
law of armed conflict, there is no such concordance with respect to: the so-called
non-lethal gases, such as tear gas (CS); incendiaries, such as napalm; and
defoliants. Moreover, the use of all of these weapons by the United States in
Vietnam has considerably exacerbated this problem.
The difference of opinion with respect to both the legal and the moral aspects
of the problem of the use of non-lethal or incapacitating chemicals such as tear
gas (lachrymatories) is evidenced by the division among the group of experts
convened by the ICRC:
" ... Some [experts] ... wondered whether the employment against the enemy
of chemical agents involving no serious danger for health might not in the final
issue be of a more humanitarian character than many other means ofwarfare. The
employment of means such as police gases (lachrymatory and others) is admitted
on the national level: why could they not a fortiori be admitted against the
enemy?"
"Other experts, on the contrary. considered that the prohibition in the 1925
Geneva Protocol should be taken as covering all gases, including those not direcdy
poisonous. in virtue of the deliberately broad terms of this prohibition in the
Protocol ... ,,115
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In 1930 the United Kingdom took the position that the use of smoke did not
violate the Protocol but that the use of tear gas did; but recendy a spokesman
for that country stated that to day's tear gas is less harmful to man than was the
1930 smoke; that it is used widely for domestic purposes for riot control; and
· use 1S
. not pro hib·1tedyb
. al conventlon.
. 116
th at 1ts
any·mtematlon
Apart from the fact that even a non-lethal, incapacitating gas will occasionally
cause a fatality, there are two major objections voiced against their use in armed
conflict: first, that as a practical matter the legality of their use becomes extremely
debatable when its purpose is "to enhance the effectiveness of conventional
weapons,',117 "to force ~ersons from protective covering to face attack by
fragmentation bombs"; 11 and second, and more important, that the use of any
chemical, albeit non-lethal, results inevitably in escalation: "except perhaps
when they are first used, non-lethal chemical weapons are unlikely to have much
effect except to set the stage for more deadly CBW operations.,,119
The second chemical weapon in the controversial area is napalm-an
extremely effective weapon and hence one which is much feared,120 and much
121
denounced.
Once again there is no general afeement as to whether this
12
chemical weapon is prohibited by the Protoco1.
And because the answer to
this question is even more difficult to ascertain than is that with respect to
lachrymatories, the position has been taken that it may be used, but only in a
123
discriminating manner.
The suggestion is made in AI7720 that in measures
of control and disarmament incendiary weapons such as napalm should be
considered separately from chemical and biological weapons and that a new
. 1S
. nee ded to c
1 rify
. 124 a suggestlon
. w hi ch 1S
. prob abiy
conventlon
a th
e·
s1tuatlOn;
an admission that this is presendy a gray area of the law.
Prior to Vietnam defoliants had never been used in warfare. As- a result, there
is no real experience upon which scientists can base their opinions as to the
125
ecological effects of their use.
Here, as in the case of napalm, the suggestion
has been made that the legality of their use depends upon the purpose or target:
while it might be permissible to use them on a forest area used by combat troops,
it would not be permissible to use them on farm lands raising crops to feed the
civilian population. Apart from the fact that it would frequendy be all but
impossible to make the correct determinations, if the use of defoliants does
change the ecology, then it would appear that the purpose or target should not
.. f:actor m
. reac hing a deC1S10n
· . on th e1r
. use. 126
b e th e d eterrrurung
Because the use of non-lethal, or incapacitating, chemical agents will
inevitably lead to the use of other, more lethal, chemical agents; because napalm
can cause both asphyxiation and unnecessary suffering; because defoliants may
well change the entire ecology of an area and could lead to the starvartion of
the civilian population; because of these and many other reasons, it is believed
that to be successful any prohibition on the use of chemical weapons in armed
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conflict must comprise all types of chemical agents, including those just
mentioned. It is on this basis that it is urged that there is a vital humanitarian
need for a universally accepted understanding that the prohibition of the use in
armed conflict of chemical agents includes any and all categories of such agents,
. . gases, mcen
.
di'
r. Ii ants. 127
·
not exc1u di ng mcapacitatmg
anes, and d elo
There is comparatively Iitde dispute on the need for a far-reaching prohibition
on the use of biologicals in armed conflict. As has been noted, there is general
agreement that, like a nuclear war, a biological war would constitute a disaster
to all mankind, belligerent and neutral, combatant and noncombatant. 128 One
grave problem in this area is that even a small, comparatively undeveloped nation
could conceivably mass the necessary resources to enter this field-and there is
considerable dispute as to whether an inspection system, even if adopted, could
function effectively.129 The United Kingdom Draft Convention on the subject
of biological weapons does not provide for inspections except in the context of
a specific complaint. 130 But, while every effort should most certainly be made
to devise means of ensuring against the illegal production and storage of
biological agents of military relevance by any nation, large or small, industrial
or undeveloped, this should not be permitted to unduly delay agreement on a
treaty completely oudawing the use in armed conflict of any and all biological
agents.

4. The non-existence cifand the needfor a complete code governing the use cifair power
in armed coriflict with emphasis on the outright prohibition cif any type cifbombing which
has as its basic target the civilian population.
The airplane was first successfully flown in 1903, just shordy prior to the
Second Hague Conference of 1907; it developed into a military weapon of
sizable proportions during World War I; during the between-wars period it
became obvious that it was a major military weapon; during and since World
War II technological advances in this field have been such that its importance
in the military arsenal is now unequalled (except for the nuclear ballistic missile);
and yet its use in armed conflict remains essentially unregulated!
In 1917, while the airplane was still in swaddling clothes, exponents of the
use of air power had already evolved the theory that
"the day may not be far offwhen aerial operations with their devastation ofenemy
lands and destruction ofindustrial and populous centres on a vast scale may become
. . al operatlons
.
f
,,131
0 war.
the pnnClp

While strategic bombing was probably not the "principal operation" ofWorld
War II, it certainly played a most important role in that war and will do so again
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in any future non-nuclear anned conflict-and perhaps even in one involving
132
the use of nuclear weapons.
As in the case of the discussion of chemical and biological weapons, while it
is unproductive to argue about whether or not the strategic bombing ofWorld
War II violated intemationallaw, 133 a brief survey of what has transpired in the
past will prove helpful in approaching the problem from the point of view of
the future. When the Second Hague Peace Conference met in 1907 the balloon
was more than a century old and had already been used for military purposes,
while the airplane had been successfully flown for the first time only four years
before. The Conference adopted a Declaration prohibiting bombing "from
balloons or by other new methods of a similar nature,,134 and Conventions
which included restrictions on land bombardment and naval bombardment.
135
provided:
Article 25 of the Regulations on the Laws and Customs ofWar
"The attack or bombardment by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or
buildings which are undefended is prohibited." (Emphasis added.)

The records of the Conference indicate that the words "by whatever means"
were included in the article in order to cover air bombardment. 136 And Article
2 of the Convention on Naval Bombardment137 excluded from the prohibition
against the bombing of undefended places "military works, military or naval
establishments, depots of arms or war materiel, workshops or plants which could
be utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or army." The argument has been
advanced, not without justification, that this provision provides a basis for the
air bombardment in the "hinterland" of objectives such as those enumerated.
This was the extent of the efforts which had been made to control the use of
air power when World War I began; and during its course the airplane became
a full-fledged weapon. However, apart from a few incidents its use was restricted
to the battlefield and, usually, to air-to-air duels. 138 In view of the technological
progress made and foreseen, it is indeed strange that although a number ofefforts
were made in the between-wars period to obtain an international agreement on
139
such matters as air bombardment none was successful.
The most authoritative
140
of these failures was the drafting of the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare.
Two articles of those Rules are particularly relevant: Article 22, which would
have prohibited aerial bombardment which was "for the purpose of terrorizing
the civilian population ... or ofinjuring noncombatants"; and Article 24, which
would have limited it to specified military objectives in the vicinity of the zone
ofland operations and then only ifit would result in a distinct military advantage
and ifit could be accomplished without "indiscriminate" bombing of the civilian
population. These two articles were intended: (1) to preserve the traditional
distinction between combatant and noncombatant; and (2) to limit the allowable
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military objectives to those in the area of the combat zone-the so-called
"occupation bombardment" because it is normally preliminary to physical
occupation.
In a discussion of air bombardment in the House of Commons onJune 21,
1938, Prime Minister Chamberlain made the following statement:
"I think we may say that there are, at any rate, three rules of intemational law or
three principles of international law which are as applicable to warfare from the
air as they are to war at sea or on land. In the first place, it is against international
law to bomb civilians as such and to make deliberate attacks upon civilian
populations. That is undoubtedly a violation of international law. In the second
place, targets which are aimed at from the air must be legitimate military objectives
and must be capable of identification. In the third place, reasonable care must be
taken in attacking these military objectives so that by carelessness a civilian
population in the neighborhood is not bombed.,,141

When World War II erupted in September 1939, President Roosevelt
immediately sent the belligerents a plea against the bombing of civilian
populations. The British, French, and Germans all replied that their planes were
instructed to attack military objectives only.142 In March 1940 the ICRC made
an appeal to the belligerents "to confirm general immunity for peaceful
populations, to define their military 0 bj ectives, and to refrain from indiscriminate
bombardments and reprisals." Once again the bellif.;erents responded
affirmatively-but continued to act as they felt necessary.1 The estimate has
been made that while World War I caused 10 million deaths, of which 500,000
were civilians, World War II caused 50 million, of which 24 million were
civilians; and that half of the civilian deaths (12 million) were caused by air
raids!144 It is worthy of note, too, that such air attacks were not specifically
included in the definition of war crimes in the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal and that there were no post-war trials based on a charge of
145
indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian population.
Nevertheless,
Spaight takes the position that "nothing that has happened in the second world
· · to 10
. discnrrunate
..
b omb'mg. ,,146
war h as shaken th e Iegal 0 b~ectlon
It is apparent from the foregoing that the attempt to control aerial
bombardment juridically has been based on analogy to two classical principles
of land and sea warfare: (1) the distinction between combatant and
147
noncombatant; and (2) the restricting oflawful targets to military objectives.
Much of the humanitarian law regulating armed conflict which has been
accepted during the past century has been based upon the distinction between
combatant and noncombatant. The airman who has crashed and been
hospitalized, the sailor who has been rescued from the sea by the enemy after
his ship has been sunk, the soldier who has been captured on the field of
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battle--all of these have been removed from combatant status and are therefore
entitled to the humanitarian protection afforded by international law. But they
are but a comparatively small percentage of the overall group of noncombatants,
the vast majority of whom are simply civilians, persons who are not a part of
the armed forces of a belligerent. It is with these latter that we are presently
concerned. The distinction between combatant and civilian has been termed,
and properly so, "the fundamental principle ofthe law ofwar." 148 But air warfare
in general, and strategic bombing in particular, has tended to blur that
· . 149 and lts
. v alidity h as b een questlOne
.
d .150
distmctlOn
Let us take three examples. First, a city of 500,000 population located in the
"hinterland" (deep inside the country and far from the scene of actual land
combat) has no factories making any product in support of the country's war
effort. Is the city a proper target for air bombardment? Second, suppose that this
same city has in its midst a factory employing 1000 workers making a very
important instrument of war. Is the factory, or the city, a proper target for air
bombardment? And third, suppose that the same city has within its area a number
of factories making important instruments of war, and employing the entire
work force of the city. Are the factories, or is the city, a proper target for air
bombardment?
Under the classical rules discussed and enumerated above, to bomb the city
with no war production factories would be terror bombing, pure and simple,
and would be a violation of the law of armed conflict. It would be an attack on
a non-military objective which could be of no military advantage to the attacker
except the possible demoralization of the enemy civilian population. With
respect to this type of activity Lauterpacht has said:
". . . it is in that prohibition, which is a clear rule of law, of intentional
terrorization-or destruction-of the civilian population as an avowed or obvious
object ofattack that lies the last vestige ofthe claim that war can be legally regulated
at all. Without that irreducible principle of restraint there is no limit to the license
. 0 ffcorce.... ,,151
and depravlty
Even the proponents of more "liberal" rules of air bombardment do not assert
152
the legality of bombing of this type.
What of the large city with only one small factory in which is made a product
of value to its country's war-effort? Certainly the bombing and destruction of
such a factory would meet the test of resulting in a distinct military advantage
to the attacker. It would not meet the test of being located in the zone of
operations-but is that test, originally established when only cities in the zone
ofland operations could be reached by artillery bombardment, a valid test to be
applied to air bombardment which can reach anywhere in the world? Moreover,
it would meet the test of the requirements for naval bombardment. It would
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probably not meet the test of being located where the bombing can take place
without danger to the civilian population. However, it appears that practice
during and since World War II would permit the factory to be subjected to air
attack. As the Report points out, in recent armed conflicts belligerents have
frequendy made accusations of attacks upon non-military objectives and the
enemy belligerent has denied the fact without either side questioning the
.
. as to types 0 f 0 b'~ectlves.
. 153
propnety
0 f the di'
stmctlon
Finally, what of the large city with many factories and most of the work force
engaged in the war effort? Let us assume that in time of armed conflict 40% of
the population constitute the work force-but that still means that 60% of the
civilian population, 300,000 people of this city, is made up of women, children,
aged, sick, etc. Must the attacker pick out individual targets, the real military
objectives? Or may he blanket the entire city with bombs, thus ensuring that all
of the plants are destroyed-but also ensuring that a large part of the population,
worker and nonworker, is likewise destroyed? Spaight would answer this latter
question in the affirmative. He says:
" ... There are in any given enemy city thousands of civilians, of'noncombatants'
in the old sense, but there are also thousands who cannot be called 'noncombatants'
in any true meaning of the tenn. The fonner suffer inevitably because the latter
have, quite properly, to be prevented from pursuing their lethal activities. It is a
tragedy ofjuxtaposition which is not entirely without precedent. Noncombatants
have often suffered in bombardments by land and naval forces, but their suffering
has never been held to make the bombardment illegal.... ,,154
And he repeatedly asserts that so-:called "target-area bombing" is an "established
usage" and that it "cannot be considered to offend against the principles of the
international law ofwar.,,155 The problem which then confronts us is that we
have returned to the doctrine of "total war,,,156 war as fought centuries ago:
when the besieged city fell, all of its inhabitants were slaughtered and the city
itself was put to the torch.
The Report makes .the suggestion with respect to strategic bombing
conducted on a target-area basis that "(it) would seem that measures to examine
the effects of this kind of military operations within their legal context may now
be desirable, and the question of defining limits might be usefully studied.,,157
With this modest proposal there can be no possible dispute. The question which
then presents itself is, what are possible solutions to the problem? And, which
of these possible solutions offers the greatest amount ofprotection to the civilian
. .,158
pop ulatlon!
Air bombardment could, of course, be limited to areas where combat is
actually taking place-the old concept of the "zone of operations." This, in
effect, means tactical bombing, and would preclude strategic bombing. While
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this would, in large part, solve the problem, it is extremely doubtful that it would
be possible to secure the agreement of Governments to such a stringent rule.
Moreover, even if the agreement of Governments were obtained, it is doubtful
that there would be compliance with such a rule in practice.
The Report proposes the establishment of safety zones,159 apparendy similar to,
but much larger than, the hospital zones referred to in Annex I to the First and
160
Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949. Presumably there would be no bombing
whatsoever permitted within the safety zones and no restrictions on bombing
elsewhere. While this might work for small groups and in small areas, it appears to
be totally impractical for the protection of tens or hundreds of millions of civilians.
The logistic problem alone would be insurmountable; and with thousands ofsquare
miles within a safety zone, the unlawful use of such areas for the protection of
important military matters would probably be inevitable.
The Draft Rules prepared by the ICRC and submitted to the XIXth
161
International Conference of the Red Cross at New Delhi in 1957
contain a
number of provisions intended to provide maximum protection for the civilian
population. An examination of the various provisions of these Draft Rules makes
it clear why they were received by the Governments with a "crushing silence."
While they are, as would be expected, as humanitarian as it would be possible
to draft such rules, they are also impractical to the point where it is extremely
doubtful that any armed force would be able to comply with them in time of
armed conflict. While this, as we shall see, is not true of all of these Draft Rules,
a much more practical set of general principles was drafted by the ICRC for
consideration by its group of experts in 1968. These principles would limit air
bombardment to identified military objectives; would place upon the attacker
the duty to use care in attacking the identified military objective; and would
apply the principle ofproportionality as between the identified military objective
162
and any possible harm to the civilian population.
These principles would
clearly prohibit target-area bombing; but there does not appear to be any reason
why such an important rule should not be specifically set out.
It is clear now, as it has been in the past, that no rule has as yet been conceived
which will give full protection to the civilian population and yet will be
acceptable to Governments. However, if man can devise instruments to send a
spaceship to the moon and have it land within a matter of yards from its target,
man can certainly devise, ifhe has not already done so, instruments which will
put a bomb exacdy on target. On the basis of this premise, the following rules
on aerial bombardment are suggested:
1. Terror Bombing Prohibited. Attacks directed against the civilian population,
as such, whether with the object of terrorizing it, or for any other reason, are
· d 163
pro hibIte.
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2. Target-Area Bombing Prohibited. It is forbidden to attack, as a single
objective, an area including several military objectives at a distance from one
another where members of the civilian population are located between such
··
164
mili·tary 0 b
~ectlves.
3. Military Objectives.
(a) Before bombing a military objective, the attacking force must have
~.c d It
. as such .165
· tly I·denuue
suffiClen
(b) In bombardments against military objectives, the attacking force must
take every possible precaution in order to avoid inflicting damage on the civilian
· 166
pop ul atlon.
(c) To constitute a military objective a target must fall within one of the
. listed·In th e annex h ereto. 167
categones
It is believed that these rules will, under present and foreseeable technological
standards, provide a maximum of protection to the civilian population, while
placing acceptable limitations on the scope of strategic bombing.

Conclusion
Anned conflict is, by its very nature, unhumanitarian. However,
humanitarian rules, properly applied, can do much to mitigate this situation. It
is believed that were the proposals made herein to be adopted as part of the law
of armed conflict, they would go far to provide additional needed protection
for both combatant and civilian noncombatant.
As has been stated, this paper represents an attempt to deal with only some of
the present major inadequacies of the law of armed conflict; and their selection
and priority must be ascribed to the personal predilections of the author. There
are a number of other areas which might well have been included and which
may well be considered by some to have equal, or even greater, importance.
These might include: enforcement of the law of armed conflict; combat at sea,
particularly submarine warfare; the status of guerrillas and partisans; the use of
starvation as a weapon; etc. The selection made of the subjects to be discussed
should certainly not be considered as in any way denigrating the importance to
the cause of humanitarianism in armed conflict of many other such subjects.
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APPENDIX 1
Twenty-third session
Agenda item 62

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
[on the report of the Third Committee (A/7433)]
2444 (XXIII). Respect for human rights in armed conflicts

TI,e General Assembly,
Recognizing the necessity of applying basic humanitarian principles in all armed conflicts,
Taking note of resolution XXIII on human rights in armed conflicts, adopted on 12 May 1968
by the Intemational Conference on Human Rights,1
Affinning that the provisions of that resolution need to be implemented as soon as possible,

1. Affinns resolution XXVIII of the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross held at
Vienna in 1965, which laid down, inter alia, the following principles for observance by all
governmental and other authorities responsible for action in armed conflicts:
(a) That the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited;
(b) That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such;
(c) That distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and
members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible;

2. Invites the Secretary-General, in consultation with the International Committee of the Red
Cross and other appropriate international organizations, to study:
(a) Steps which could be taken to secure the better application of existing humanitarian
international conventions and rules in all armed conflicts;
(b) The need for additional humanitarian international conventions or for other appropriate
legal instruments to ensure the better protection ofcivilians, prisoners and combatants in all armed
conflicts and the prohibition and limitation of the use of certain methods and means of warfare;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to take all other necessary steps to give effect to the provisions
of the present resolution and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session on
the steps he has taken;
4. Further requests Member States to extend all possible assistance to the Secretary-General in
the preparation of the study requested in paragraph 2 above;
5. Calls upon all States which have not done so to become parties to the Hague Convention
of 1899 and 1907,2 the Geneva Protocol of 19253 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.4
1748th plenary meeting,
19 December 1968.

FOOTNOTES
1. See Final Act oj the International Cot!forence on Human Rights (United Nations publication,
Sales No.: E. 68. XIV.2), p. 18.
2. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Hague Convention and Declarations
1899-1907 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1918).
3. League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138.
4. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75 (1950), Nos. 970-973.

154

Levie on the Law of War
Notes

1. Stone, Legal Controls ofInternatioml Conflict 335 (1954, reprinted 1959). The statement tlut the
codified law of war still exceeds the law of peace is probably now no longer true in view of the perhaps
unanticipated success of the Internatioml Law Commission in securing the acceptance of a number ofits draft
conventions such as those on the Law of the Sea, Diplomatic Immunities, Consular Relations, and Treaties.
2. See note 84 itifra. To a limited extent it might be considered that the 1954 Hague Convention for
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Anned Conflict (249 U.N.T.S. 215) ilio falls in this
category; but, of course, it attempts to protect property, not people.
3. International Committee of the Red Cross, Reaffirmation and Development of the Laws and
Customs Applicable in Anned Conflict 6 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ICRC, Reaffirmation]. This document
is a report submitted to the XXIst Internatioml Conference of the Red Cross, held in Istanbul in September
1969.
4. It has at times been suggested that the condition for the termination of the 1907 Hague Declaration
Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons (36 Stat. 2439, 2 Am.]. Int'I L. Supp.216
(1908» has never occurred and that, therefore, the Declaration is still in force. In view of the practice ofnations
prior to, during, and since World War II, there would appear to be litde merit to such an argument. Moreover,
the United States and the United Kingdom are the only major powers which ratified it.
5. "The League of Nations and the Laws of War," 1920-21 Brit. Ybk. Int'I L. 109, 114-15.
6. Ray, Commentaire du Pacte de la Societe des Nations 528 (1930).
7. Constantopoulos, "Les raisons de la crise du droit de la guerre," 7 ]ahrbuch rur Internationales Recht
22, 25 (1957). In this regard, see note 11 itifra.
8. Writing in 1931 one author pointed out that neither the Pact of the League of Nations, nor the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, could guarantee tlut there would be no future wars. Rasmussen, Code des
Prisonniers de Guerre 72 (1931). And commenting on the 1934 Monaco Conference, de la Pradelle said:
" ... Doctors and lawyers denounced the conspiracy ofsilence which, lest public opinion be frightened,
had been adopted in official circles and which consisted of not speaking about the laws of war. " (Translation
mine.)
La Coruerence Diplomatique et les Nouvelles Conventions de Geneve du 12 aout 1949, at 13 (1951).
9. 36 Stat. 2277; 2 Am.]. Int'l L. Supp. 90 (1908).
10. It is true that occasional attempts to further codifY some limited aspects of the law of war were made,
despite the inhospitable atmosphere. Thus, naval conferences were held in Washington in 1922 and in London
in 1930 and 1936. However, these conferences, which were not even always successful in producing an
effective result, merely scratched the surface of the work which needed to be done.
11. It is essential to bear in mind that to a considerable extent the existing law of war was observed during
World War II. True, there were many well publicized violations of that law, the so-called "conventional war
crimes." But see Baxter, "The Role of Law in Modem War," 1953 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l L. 90, 92 where the
following appears:
"Those who are most scornful of the attempts which the law of war makes to mitigate human suffering
in war inevitably point to the barbarities which were practiced in the second World War. These accusations
overlook the extent to which states did comply with the law of war, the advantage of a fixed standard against
which to measure the conduct of those who were the most flagrant in the violation of all international law,
and the subsequent vindication of the validiry of the norms ofinternationallaw through the imposition of
sanctions in the war crimes proceedings.... "
12. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of the First
Session, 1949 Ybk. Int'I L. Comm'n 281. And the International Law Commission did not stand alone. See,
for example, the position ofScelle, set forth in Francois, "Reconsideration des principes du droit de la guerre,"
47 (I) Annuaire de I'lnstitut de Droit International 491, 493 (1957); and Fenwick's comment on Baxter,
"Forces for Compliance with the Law of War," 1964 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'I L. 82, 97.
13. See, for example, Kunz, "The Chaotic Status of the Laws of War and the Urgent Necessity for their
Revision," 45 Am.]. Int'I L. 37 (1951); Lauterpacht, "The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War," 29
Brit. Ybk. Int'I L. 360 (1952); Coudert, Francois and Lauterpacht, "La revision du droit de la guerre," 45 (I)
Annuaire de I'lnstitut de Droit Internatioml555 (1954);]essup, "Political and Humanitarian Approaches to
Limitation of Warfare," 51 Am.]. Int'I L. 757, 759 (1957); Accioly, "Guerre et neutralite en face du droit des
gens contemporain" in Melange Basdevant 1-2, 7 (1960); and Pietet, "The Need to Restore the Laws and
Customs Relating to Anned Conflict," Rev. Int'l Comm'n]ur., No. I (March 1969), 22, 37.
14. Actually, the 1907 Hague Regulations (note 9 supra) were in large part a comparatively minor revision
of the Regulations attached to the 1899 Second Hague Convention, 32 Stat. 1803; I Am.]. Int'l L. Supp.
129 (1907).
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15. The following very apt statement appears in Pictet, "The XXth International Conference of the Red
Cross: Results in the Legal Field," 7]. Int'l Comm'n]ur., 3, 11 (1966):
" ••• whereas the ruined cities [of World War II] have been rebuilt, the States have done nothing to
restore the Hague Rules, which vanished under the same ruins •.. While the techniques of offensive action
have taken giant strides forward, the only rules which can be invoked date from 1907. Such a situation is
flagrant in its absurdity."
The Secretary-General's Report on Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict, N7720, para. 131, is to
the same effect, stating that military-technical developments "have brought major changes which the authors
of existing international instruments could not envisage." And that many governments share the belief that
affirmative action is needed in this area is demonstrated by a number of the answers received by the
Secretary-General in response to his inquiry regarding the preparation of N7720. See the replies of Finland
(at 76 of the original United Nations document); Hungary (at 77); Morocco (at 82); Norway (at 82); and
Romania (at 85). This Report is, of course, the basis for this paper and for the Fourteenth Hammarskjold
Forum of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. It will be referred to simply as "the Report"
or as N7720, and will be cited as N7720.
16. This reluctance on its part, and a similar reluctance on the part of the various subsidiary organs of
the United Nations, is noted in AJ7720, para. 19.
17. Resolution XXIII of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, April-May 1968
(United Nations publication, Sales No.: E. 68. XIV 2), at 18.
18. See Appendix 1 hereto.
19. See note 15 supra.
20. It will be noted that operative paragraph 1 has now been given a somewhat different emphasis, an
emphasis of a type which has tc:nded to permeate all United Nations actions in recent years. It is to be hoped
that this will not be to the detriment of a revision and modernization of the general law of war which, of
course, is, or should be, largely applicable in both international and internal conflicts.
21. "Powerful" in the sense that it has strong support from people all over the world who are acquainted
with and who welcome its methods and objectives. Apart from its dedication to humanitarian endeavors, the
ICRC has found that "belligerents necessarily consider this law [of war] as a single whole, and the inadequacy
of the rules relating to the conduct of hostilities has a negative impact on the observance of the Geneva
Conventions." ICRC, Reaffirmation 8.
22. It has been the practice to refer to the rules governing the conduct of hostilities as "Hague" law and
to the rules governing the treatment of people (wounded and sick, prisoners of war, civilians) as "Geneva"
law. See, for example, Pictet, note 13 supra, at 23. There is no merit to such a distinction. The 1899 and the
1907 Hague Regulations dealt with, inter alia, prisoners of war and military occupation. Those subjects are
now covered in whole or in part by the Third and Fourth 1949 Geneva Conventions, respectively (see note
25 i,ifra). And the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol (see note 84 infra) as well as the ICRC's Draft Rules (see note
26 irifra) are both concerned with permissible weapons, methods of attacks, etc., subjects which are basic to
the Hague Regulations. Were it not for the 1954 Hague Cultural Convention (see note 2 supra), it might well
be assumed that, the Netherlands no longer having the neutral status which it enjoyed prior to World War
II, the nations of the world prefer to discuss subjects dealing with hostilities in still-neutral Switzerland. In any
event, whether it is "Hague" law governing the conduct ofhostilities or "Geneva" law governing the treatment
of persons, its ultimate objective is humanitarian in nature.
23. This new version was the 1929 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the
Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, 47 Stat. 2074; 118 L.N.T.S. 303; 27 Am.]. Int'IL. Supp. 43 (1933).
24. The 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 47 Stat. 2021; 118
L.N.T.S. 343, 27 Am.]. Int'IL. Supp. 59 (1933).
25. The 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditon of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field (the "First" Convention), 6 U.S.T. 3114; 75 U.N.T.S. 31; the 1949 Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea (the "Second" Convention), 6 U.S.T. 3217; 75 U.N.T.S. 85; the 1949 Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (the "Third" Convention), 6 U.S.T. 3316; 75
U.N.T.S. 135; 47 Am.]. Int'lL. Supp. 119 (1953); and the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
ofCi'lilian Persons in Time of War (the "Fourth" Convention), 6 U.S.T. 3516; 75 U.N.T.S. 287; 50 Am.
]. Int'l L. Supp. 724 (1956). Regarding this achievement Spaight is reported to have said:
"The historians of the future will be puzzled by the conclusion of three [sic] new Geneva Conventions
in 1949, and the failure of the powers who agreed to them to do anything to regulate those methods of war
which, if continued, will make the humanitarian provisions of those Conventions read like hypocritical
nonsense."

Quoted in Dunbar, "The Legal Regulation of Modern Warfare," 40 Trans. Grot. Soc. 83, 91 (1955).
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26. This is the Fourth Convention, note 25 supra. Of course, even the ICRC is not always immediately
successful in its humanitarian efforts. In 1957 it presented to the XIXth International Conference of the Red
Cross, meeting in New Delhi, its Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian
Population in Time ofWar. The Conference adopted a resolution requesting the ICRC to transmit the Draft
Rules to the Governments. To quote the ICRC Director-General:
"[T]heir replies took the form of a crushing silence, with the exception of a few well-disposed countries.
The great powers, in particular, remained silent ... "
Pictet, note 15 supra, at 12.
27. Operative subparagraphs 1 (a), (b), and (c) of AIRES/2444 (XXIII) were taken verbatim from the
Red Cross resolution which is itself cited in the opening part of operative paragraph 1 of the United Nations
resolution. The General Assembly omitted a fourth paragraph of the Red Cross resolution which stated "that
the general principles of the Law of War apply to nuclear and similar weapons."
28. See Resolutions X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XVII, and XVIII, 9 Int'! Rev. Red Cross 613-19 (1969).
Of particular relevance is the following extract from Resolution XIII, in which the Conference
"requests the ICRC on the basis of its report [ICRC, Reaffirmation] to pursue actively its efforts in this
regard with a view to:
1. proposing, as soon as possible, concrete rules which would supplement the existing humanitarian law,
2. inviting governmental, Red Cross and other experts representing the principal legal and social systems in
the world to meet for consultations with the ICRC on these proposals,
3. submitting such proposals to Governments for their comments, and
4. if it is deemed advisable, recommending the appropriate authorities to convene one or more diplomatic
conferences of States parties to the Geneva Conventions and other interested States, in order to elaborate
international legal instruments incorporating those proposals."
29. As of October 15, 1969, just over 20 years from the date on which they were signed, the four 1949
Geneva Conventions had 125 ratifications and accessions. 9 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 646 (1969). (The data
contained in note 49 ofAI7720 is incorrect. That contained in Annex 1m of AI7720 is correct.) It should be
observed that all of the great powers are Parties to these Conventions. It is interesting to note that the practice
of Governments is apparently contrary to the decision of the International Law Commission discussed in the
text in connection with note 12 supra. Ratifications and accessions to these "war" conventions far exceed
those to any of the conventions drafted by the Commission, as important as these latter are.
30. See text in connection with note 12 supra.
31. ICRC, Reaffirmation 11
32. Para. 21.
33. As further evidence of the post-World War II antipathy to the use of the word "war," it might be
noted that, apart from Article 107 referring to World War II, it is not used anywhere in the Charter of the
United Nations; instead we find such terms as "international disputes," "breaches of peace," "acts of
aggression," etc. Universal adoption of the term "armed conflict," a term already familiar to those acquainted
with the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1954 Hague Cultural Convention, will certainly result in
uniformity oflanguage-even if some who are less able to accept new ideas will, for a time, have to think
twice and then say "Oh, you mean the law of war!"
34. This problem is, of course, also of major importance with respect to internal conflict (civil war) and
the question of the application of one of the so-called "common" articles (Article 3) of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.
35. 36 Stat. 2259; 2 Am.]. Int'l L. Supp. 85 (1908).
.
36. " •.. Thus the wars ofItaly with Abyssinia in 1935, of]apan with China in 1937, of Germany with
Poland in 1939, of Russia with Finland in the same year, and of]apan with the United States in 1941, opened
without a formal declaration of war."
2 Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, International Law 292-93 (7th ed., 1952). But there were a number of cases of
compliance during both World War I (ibid., at 294, footnote 2) and World War II (ibid., at 295, footnote 3).
37. Pictet (eel), Commentary on the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War 19-20 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Pictet, Third Commentary].
38. I Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, at 47 [hereinafter cited as Final
Record]. This is the first paragraph of common Article 2 and is, therefore, identical in Article 2 of each of the
four 1949 Geneva Conventions. It is also employed in Article 18 (I) of the 1954 Hague Cultural Convention,
supra note 2.
39. Pictet, Third Commentary 22-23.
40. Levie, "Maltreatment of Prisoners of War in Vietnam," 48 B.U.L. Rev. 323, 330 (1968); Note,
"The Geneva Convention and the Treatment ofPrisoners ofWarin Vietnam," 80 Harv. L. Rev. 851, 858-59
(1967).
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41. ICRC, Reaffirmation 94.
42. It is obvious that this proposal jumps squarely into the problem of the enforcement of the law of
armed conflict which is, without question, another area requiring major action.
43. 1m Final Record 11 and 16. Further amplification of the proposal, which was clearly required, was
not forthcoming and its adoption was not pressed.
44. Annex 21, III Final Record 30.
45. Resolution 2, I Final Record 361. So far as is known, this resolution has never been implemented.
46. In addition, it might be noted that the Security Council undoubtedly already has the power to make
such a decision; that it has heretofore, in effect, made such a decision, but always in the context of a call for
a cessation of the armed conflict so found to exist (e.g, S/RES/233 (1967), adopted June 6,1967, in which
the Security Council states its concern "at the outbreak offighting" in the Middle East and calls for "a cessation
of all military activities in the area'1; and that it has not, and probably will not, ever exercise such power in
the context of the proposal under discussion as to do so would be an admission of its inability to eliminate
completely the breach of the peace involved.
47. To gain support at the outset and to ensure complete impartiality, it might be denied jurisdiction
over fact situations existing at the time ofits creation.
48. The General Assembly has, on a number of occasions, called upon its Members "to make effective
use of existing facilities for fact-finding" (e.g., AlRES12330 (XXII). The present proposal would, in effect,
merely create a new specialized fact-finding body and provide for certain results to flow automatically if
specified facts are found. It is a variation and expansion of the Commission ofInquiry originally created by
the First Hague Convention of 1899 (32 Stat. 1779; 1 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 107 (1907) and applied for the
first time in the Dogger Bank Incident (Scott, Hague Court Reports 403 (1916».
49. Of course, many additional details of creation and operation would necessarily be included in any
convention establishing such a body; but these appear to be unnecessary for the purposes of this paper.
However, it should be mentioned that, as in the case ofthe Protecting Power in the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
provision would have to be made for the ICEHRAC to use, when needed, an operational staff.
50. While it is true that the provision for automatic economic and communications sanctions goes even
somewhat beyond the comparable provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, it is suggested that the
majority oflaw-abiding States have come to realize that there will always be a few delinquents among them
and that only the absolute knowledge of automatic, effective, and universal sanctions will tend to keep the
delinquent States in line. (The sanctions against Rhodesia can scarcely be described with those adjectives!)
51. Certainly, the 125 ratifications of and accessions to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which were
drafted before many of the acceding States were even in existence as members of the international community,
were not obtained merely because of an overwhelming urge on the part of nations to be Parties to it; they
were obtained because ofmoral and humanitarian pressures and because few nations were willing to be pointed
at as not having accepted these great humanitarian expressions.
52. Can there be any great doubt that President Nixon's announcement concerning his intended actions
with respect to chemical and biological warfare (see section 3 irifra) was motivated not only by humanitarian
considerations but also by the increasing feeling of isolation which the United States was being compelled to
endure in this respect, as well as diplomatic pressure from friends, resolutions of the General Assembly,
resolutions of the ICRC, etc.?
53. Levie, "Prisoners of War and the Protecting Power," 55 AmJ. Int'l L. 374, 376 (1961).
54. Ibid., 377-78.
55. See note 24 supra.
56. The basic article relating to the Protecting Power is one of the common articles, Article 8/8/8/9.
References to this institution appear throughout the Conventions. See Levie, note 53 supra, at 380-81, where
there is a list of36 articles in the Prisoner-of-War Conv~ntion containing references to the Protecting Power.
57. Common Article 10/10/10/11 covers this latter subject. The U.S.S.R. and the other Communist
countries all reserved to these articles.
58. AI7720, para. 213.
59. Ibid.
60. It is probable that the United States has not even attempted to secure the designation of a Protecting
Power in Vietnam because such action would appear to constitute a legal recognition not only of North
Vietnam as a State, but also, and perhaps more important, of the existence of a state of war.
61. AI7720, at 78 of the original United Nations document.
62. Ibid., at 91.
63. Ibid., para. 215. See also para. 203.
64. "Nigeria/Biafra: Armed Conflict with a Vengeance," Rev. Int'} Comm'nJur., No.2 aune 1969)
10,13.
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65. See note 28 supra. In view of the tact that the 1949 Geneva Conventions clearly indicate that the
activities of the Protecting Power and of the ICRC are complementary and not alternative (see Levie, note
53 supra, at 394-96), it is difficult to understand why the resolution was phrased in the disjunctive.
66. ICRC, Reaffirmation, at 7, where the following appears:
" •.. Thus the wars ofItaly with Abyssinia in 1935, ofJapan with China in 1937, of Germany with Poland
in 1939, ofRussia with Finland in the same year, and ofJapan with the United States in 1941, opened without
a formal declaration of war."
To the same effect see ibid., 87-88.
67. Common Article 9/9/9/10 is the basic provision of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions relating to
the activities of the ICRC. Paragraph 3 of common Article 10/10/10/11, concerning replacements and
substitutes for Protecting Powers, permits the ICRC to offer its services to perform the humanitarian functions
of the Protecting Power when there is no Protecting Power. This is probably the basis upon which the ICRC
has acted in the post-1949 Geneva Conventions era. One ofits more successful recent efforts was in connection
with the Honduras-Salvador conflict. 9 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 493-96 (1969), 10 ibid., 95-105 (1970).
68. AI7720, para. 226. Italy suggested considering the possibility of "delegating authority to the
International Red Cross, so that that body may, in the case ofarmed conflict, ensure that its own representatives
are continually present in the belligerent countries throughout the duration of the conflict." Ibid., at 79 of the
original United Nations document. Asomewhatsimilarsuggestion was made by the group ofexperts convened
by the ICRC. ICRC, Reaffirmation 107.
69. Le Comite International de la Croix-Rouge et Ie Conflit de Coree: Recueil des Documents, passim
(2 vols., 1952); British Ministry of Defence, Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea 33-34 (1955).
70. "The International Committee and the Vietnam Conflict," 6 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 399, 402-03
(1966); St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 5, 1970, p. 2B, col. 1.
71. Strangely enough, it has apparendy been permitted to function with virtually no restrictions in Israel
for the protection of both prisoners of war and of civilians in the occupied territory. See, for example, 8 Int'l
Rev. Red Cross 18-19 (1968); 9 ibid., 173-76,417-19,488, and 640. On the other hand, the United Nations
has encountered some difficulty in making an investigation ofthe treatment ofcivilians in the occupied territory
because of the Israeli position that the resolution calling for it was biased and one-sided. However, even the
International Conference of the Red Cross found it necessary to express concern about the plight of these
people. 9 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 613 (1969).
72. The Report also makes a suggestion to this latter effect N7720, para. 217. It is entirely possible,
however, that some States, notably Switzerland and Sweden, which did yeoman work as Protecting Powers
during both World Wars, would not wish to shoulder these additional, and potentially controversial, problems.
This would make the solution herein suggested all the more necessary. It might be appropriate to cover this
eventuality by providing for a possible division of functions, where desired, the Protecting Power, if there be
one, performing the traditional functions with respect to wounded and sick, prisoners of war, and civilians,
and the substitute performing the function with respect to the conduct of hostilities.
73. In ICRC, Reaffirmation 89-90, this is ascribed to the tact that many of the conflicts since 1949 have
been of an internal nature; but what of Korea, the Yemen, Vietnam, the Middle East, etc.? In none of these
conflicts has there been a Protecting Power.
74. In N7720, para. 216, it is suggested that a new organ be created which could "offer its services in
case the Parties do not exercise their choice." For the reasons already advanced, it is not belived that any system
other than one which operates automatically will constitute a solution to the problem.
75. This calls for selection by one State, acceptance by the State so selected, and approval by the State
on whose territory the Protecting Power is to operate. See Levie, note 53 supra, at 383.
76. The Report (N7720, para. 218) makes two suggestions with respect to the legal effect of the
designation of a Protecting Power or of an international organ as a substitute therefor: (1) that the Protecting
Power, or the substitute, should be considered as an agent of the international community and not merely of
one belligerent State; and (2) that the designation, being solely humanitarian in purpose, should have no legal
consequences. The first comment is already true under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, although the term
"Parties to the Convention" is deemed appropriate rather than "international community" (see Levie, note
53 supra, at 382-83); and the second comment might well be accomplished by the use of a provision such as
that appearing in the last paragraph of common Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions: "The application of the
preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict." This provision was eventually
applied during the French-Algerian conflict of the late 1950s and early 1960s.
77. The ICRC experts were also of this opinion. ICRC, Reaffirmation 89 and 91. Had such an
international body heretofore existed with such powers and duties, there could have been immediate
investigations of allegations of such charges as the use of gas in the Yemen by the United Arab Republic, of
bacteriological agents in Korea by the United Nations Command, etc. In this regard, see Joyce, Red Cross
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International 201 (1959). In fact, it is probably safe to say that under these circumstances many such allegations
would never be made in the first place!
78. The subject is there discussed at length. Aln20, paras. 216-225. Despite the cautious defense of the
use of a political organization as a Protecting Power, made in the last paragraph cited, it would appear that,
for the reasons heretofore stated (see text in connection with note 46 supra), the creation ofa new, non-political
body is basically the position taken by the Report.
79. See note 57 supra. The reservations were justified. The article, in effect, authorizes the Detaining
Power to unilaterally select a substitute for the Protecting Power. The reservations would merely require
agreement on the part of the Power of Origin, as in the case of the selection of the Protecting Power itself.
See note 75 supra. Of course, were it a Party to the new convention which we are discussing, it would have
agreed in advance to the filling of the void by the ICEHRAC.
80. I Final Record 201. Concerning this resolution, see the text in connection with note 45 supra.
81. Once again, of course, the lCEHRAC would need a fairly large operational staff, including many
specialists, to serve as its eyes and em to collect and sift evidence. But this is no more than an administrative
problem which should present no insurmountable difficulty.
82. There is no reason whatsoever why, under appropriate legal safeguards (see note 76 supra), these
provisions could not be made applicable to internal conflicts, and to conflicts of "national liberation," which
are frequently much more sanguinary than are international conflicts. "NigerialBiafra: Armed Conflict with
a Vengeance," loc. at., note 64 supra.
83. The question will undoubtedly be asked inunediately why the present discussion concerning the
elimination of chemical and biological weapons does not include nuclear weapons. That matter has been, and
continues to be, one of the major subjects of discussion at the meetings of the nuclear powers themselves and
at the meetingi of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (formerly the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament). The status of these various discussions and the reason for the stalemate which
has now existed for more than a decade is well known. It could not conceivably serve any useful purpose for
this paper to make a proposal for the banning of nuclear weapons, with or without inspection. Probably only
some scientific breakthrough will solve that problem. In the meantime we have what some call "the equilibrium
of dissuasion." ICRC, Reaffirmation 50.
84. The Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases and of Bacteriological Methods ofWar6.re, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925 (94 L.N.T.S. 65; 25
Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 94 (1931», uses the term "bacteriological." Because scientific developments since 1925
have indicated the possible use in armed conflict ofvarious living organisms (e.g, rickettsiae, viruses, and fungi),
as well as bacteria, the more inclusive "biological" is now very generally used. In this regard see the Report
ofthe Secretary-General based on the Report of the Group of Consultant Experts, United Nations Document
Al7575/Rev. I, Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effect of Their Possible Use
(United Nations publication, Sales No.: E. 69, 1.24), paras. 17-18 [hereinafter cited as UN, CB Weapons],
and Article I of the British Draft Convention, note 130 irifra, which refers to "microbial and other biological
agents."
85. In the Foreword to the Report of the Secretary-General (see UN, CB Weapons, note 84 supra, at
viii), U Thant quoted as follows from his 1968 Annual Report:
" ••• The question of chemical and biological weapons has been overshadowed by the question
of nuclear weapons, which have a destructive power several orders of magnitude greater than that of
chemical and biological weapons. Nevertheless, these too are weapons of mass destruction regarded
with universal horror. In some respects, they may be even more dangerous than nuclear weapons
because they do not require the enormous expenditure of financial and scientific resources that are
required for nuclear weapons. Almost all countries, including small ones and developing ones, may
have access to these weapons, which can be manufactured quite cheaply, quickly and secretly in small
laboratories or factories ••• "
86. A comparatively short list ofsome of the works in this area will be found in UN, CB Weapons, note
84 supra, at 99. To that list should certainly be added McCarthy, The Ultimate Folly: War by Pestilence,
Asphyxiation, and Defoliation (1969).
87. Mention need be made of only two authoritative forums where numerous discussions of this subject
have taken place: the United Nations, where it has been discussed at length both in the First Committee and
in the General Assembly; and the United States Congress where Representative Richard D. McCarthy and
others similarly concerned have not allowed the matter to pass unnoticed. See, for example, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 19, 1969,p.9,col 1.
88. One author makes the rather pessimistic evaluation that this recent concern "is perhaps an index of
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Some Major Inadequacies in the Existing Law Relating to the
Protection of Individuals During Armed Conflict
Addendum
This Working Paper for the 14th Hammarskjold Forum conducted by the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York was written in 1970. Since that
time there has been no change in the status of the first problem mentioned, the
absence of "a method for the automatic determination that a particular State
relationship requires the application of the law of armed conflict." Article 1 of
the 1907 Convention (II) Relative to the Opening ofHostilities requires a "previous
and explicit warning, in the form either of a declaration of war, giving reasons,
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or an ultimatum with conditional declaration ofwar. " This provision has become
a nullity. Article 2 of the four 1949 Geneva ConventionsJor the Protedion oj War
Victims provides that these Conventions become applicable "in all cases of
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized
by one of them." The lack of value of this provision was demonstrated during
the hostilities in Vietnam where the North Vietnamese disregarded it by merely
asserting that all captured American personnel were war criminals captured in
flagrante delicto. There have been innumerable international armed conflicts since
1970 but in not one instance has there been a formal declaration of war or any
other affirmative action indicating that the international law of war was deemed
applicable. The last known compliance with the cited provision was when the
Soviet Union declared war on Japan on 8 August 1945 during World War II.
The second item discussed was "the need for a method which will ensure the
presence in the territory of each State party to an armed conflict of a Protecting
Power or an international body with adequate authority to police compliance
with that law." The international community had an opportunity to correct this
defect but failed miserably, The Diplomatic Conference which met in Geneva
from 1974 to 1977 before completing the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions 018 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection ojVictims ofInternational
Anned Conflicts (protocol I) drafted provisions (Article 5 thereof) which once again
mean that there will usually be no Protecting Power and no substitute for a
Protecting Power. (The United States has not as yet ratified that Protocol.) In the
conflict in Korea there were no Protecting Powers. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) offered its services to both sides. The
United Nations Command (UNC) accepted the offer and the ICRC made over
100 inspections ofUNC prisoner of war facilities. The North Koreans and the
Chinese Communists never even deigned to answer the ICRC's offers. There
is nothing in the 1977 Protocol I which will change that situation as every action
is dependent upon the willingness of the Party to the conflict. Thus, if the system
for designating a Protecting Power fails, as it probably will, a sort of lottery
system may be instituted, but its value is dubious; and the ICRC may offer its
services as a substitute, but the functioning of the ICRC as such a substitute "is
subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict"--a consent which countries
like North Korea and the People's Republic of China, and a number of other
nations, will not give.
The third item discussed was "the need for a complete and total prohibition
of the use in armed conflict of any and all categories of chemical and biological
weapons." An addendum to the article entitled Nuclear, Chemical and Biological
Weapons in this collection updates the subject.
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The final item discussed in that paper was "the need for a complete code
governing the use of air power in armed conflict with emphasis on the outright
prohibition of any type of bombing which has as its basic target the civilian
population." Some progress has been made in this area. Article 51 (2) of the 1977
Additional Protocol I prohibits making the civilian population the object of attack,
Articles 54(2) and 56 thereof contain provisions aimed at protecting the civilian
population from attack. Article 2(1) of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions

on the Use if Incendiary Weapons (protocol III to the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use cif Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to
be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects) specifically prohibits attacks
on the civilian population by incendiary weapons; and Article 2(2) thereof
prohibits attacks on a military objective located within a concentration of
civilians by air delivered incendiary weapons. (The United States has not as yet
ratified this Protocol, although it has ratified the. convention and Protocols I and

IIthereo£)

